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We could not understand people 
who were so violent to each other.
We had to call out the sungu-sungu 
every night.
- Ngara Village Leader
The refugees ate all the maize while it 
was still green. There was no seed. I have 
gotten 10 tonnes from the Council o f Churches.
Today I go to one village to see how Village 
Executive Officer's distribution o f 10 kilos 
to each household is going.
- Diocese o f Kagera, 
Development Canon
To plan is to choose.
Choose to go forward.
Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere
I.
H o s t in g  H o a r d s  O n  T h e  F a r  P e r ip h e r y : A n  O v e r v ie w
Ngara and Karagwe Districts in Tanzania's Kagera Region bordering Rwanda and Burundi are 
the far periphery - not only from Europe but also from Dar es Salaam. They are among 
Tanzania's most isolated, least known and lowest cash income districts although on nutrition 
and other social parameters they may rank in the middle third. Ngara iri particular has had 
rapid population growth since the late 1960s because o f the availability of relatively fertile 
land, less drought risk than for most of the Lake zone and improving access to water, 
sanitation, primary education and health care.
Since late 1993 the 500,000 odd residents o f these two districts have hosted on the order of 
900,000 Rwandan and Burundian refugees. The first Burundian wave returned home when 
conditions became less fraught at home but were almost instantly succeeded by the Rwandan
2tidal wave following the assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, the politico- 
ethnic genocide which ensued and the inexorable advance of the invading (since 1990) forces 
o f the Rwanda Patriotic Front who became the country's rulers by July. As of Lent 1995, the 
Rwandan and renewed Burundian refugee total was well over 600,000 with arrivals over the 
last six months of 50 to 2,000 a day (many wounded) outstripping voluntary official and 
unofficial returns averaging perhaps 25 a day. In late March, Tanzania felt compelled to shut 
its borders against up to 200,000 more Rwandan refugees seeking to flee from refugee camps 
in Burundi because it had no assurances food would be forthcoming even for those already in 
Tanzania.
The refugees are housed in several huge camps - the largest, Bonaco, near the Rusomo Falls 
bridge to Rwanda, nearly 250,000. One very small (1,400) camp attests to the intense ethnic 
cleavage in Rwanda. All members of'mixed' Hutu-Tutsi refugee families are there. Both the 
number - under one-quarter per cent of all refugees - and the need to isolate (and guard - not 
always 100% successfully) them, speak for themselves.
This paper's central concern is not the camps nor the refugees but the impact on Ngarans 
(outnumbered two to one by refugees) and Karagweans (with about the inverse ratio).
The impact falls into three groupings: the initial tidal wave influx; the cash income access 
nexus and the environmental costs. The first and last are virtually totally negative; the second 
with large (relative to District cash income) plusses and minuses probably cross-cancelling at 
macro level but in ways shifting and increasing inequality of income distribution.
The initial impact was one o f terror, death stalked Rwanda and until the deployment o f 
Tanzanian troops and reinforcement of police, there was great fear it would cross the corpse- 
clogged Kagera River, the scrub field land boundary with Rwanda, or the road median and hill 
crest line with Burundi.
Beyond terror (and terrorising by their violent behaviour to each other, though rarely to 
Tanzanians), the refugees acted in ways analogous to a horde of locusts. Hungry, they 
bought, bartered or took maize, plantains, beans and cassava. Needing to cook, they swept up 
text books, school furniture and church benches. Camping in huge numbers, they damaged 
tree and field crops. With a different sanitary tradition, they filled village latrines (near 
universal in most o f Ngara) and fouled hillsides and water sources. Ill and suffering from 
exhaustion, they used up dispensaries' modest drug stocks.
The total costs look low - slightly over $1 million (see Table 1) for 100 border and transit 
villages or $10,000 per village. Set against perhaps $500 to $750 weekly total combined cash 
incomes of residents o f most villages and the slender resources of local government and of
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Lutheran Churches, co-operative societies and the women's groups relating to the child 
nutrition-health-local initiatives programme) those sums acquire Kilimanjaroesque dimensions.
The cash income loss/gain in 1994-5 is of the order of $5 million probably with a small net 
positive balance. Those hired by and those selling to refugee support bodies and those selling 
to refugees (especially plantains, banana beer, poles and firewood) may have earned 
$5,500,000. Market access loss (transport system damage/delay, loss o f Kigali market) were 
at least $3,500,000. Added to initial costs and medical services diversion the 'cash' cost 
appears to have been about $5,000,000.
The most serious - and hardest to estimate - cost cluster is environmental degradation. Its 
initial form is added workload (on women and girls) to go further to collect food and water. 
While concentrated around camps, this was probably running at 20,000 odd woman years per 
annum by the end of 1994 (an average of an hour and a half per household per day). It will 
worsen so long as refugees remain (and the circles of tree-bush stripped land around the 
camps grows). Only five years after their departure - the probable time to restore wood 
balance - can it be abated significantly. The longer the period o f stress the greater the erosion 
and other land degradation refugee related costs, which despite rapid population growth after 
1961 were still low in 1994-5.
How to make whole again is conceptually simple. Modest resource injections would 
complement village, local government, domestic social sector initiatives to reverse initial 
damage. The market access renewal basically requires District and Regional trunk road 
renewal and completion of the Burundi border-Rusomo Falls link highway (delayed by 
contractor diversion to refugee camps). The ecological/environmental issues require at least 
five year tree establishment/farm systems strengthening programmes. In sum, the five year 
cost would be likely to be under $35 million ($70 per resident but under one-fifth o f the 
estimated 1994-95 refugee support bill).
Until late 1994 when initiatives by the Tanzania Prime Minister's Office, the Dutch 
Government and UNICEF, began to analyse and present the 'host district problem' little 
attention and less resources had gone to Ngarans and Karagweans beyond up to $10 million 
Tanzanian security spending and $1 million replacement drug and medical personnel support. 
The March 1994 special Consultative Group expressed understanding o f the problem - as 
presented to it along the lines set out here - but what follow-up flows there may be is unclear 
especially in respect to roads.
4TABLE 1
REFUGEE COSTS - 1994
(S - 1994 prices)
1. Initial Village Impact
2. Transport Cost - Lust Sales and Higher Haulage
3. Medical Services Diversion
4. Fuel and W ater Additional Workload
5. Agriculture: Land Loss and Degradation
1.170.000
3.500.000
125.000
4.875.000
250.000
Total Costs $9,920,000
6. Employment by/Sales to Refugee Servers 2,000,000
7. Sales to Refugees 3.500,000
Total Gains $5,500,000
(Summarised from Table 4)
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PROGRAMME COST: 1995-1999
($000 at 1994 Prices)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
A Initial Village Impact 
Reversal
750 - - - - 750
B Transport Rehabilitation 7,800 6,000 4,750 1,500 - 20,050
C Health 375 225 200 200 200 1,200
D Water 275 475 350 - - 1,100
E Forcstry/Agro-Forestry 870 1,775 1,750 1,000 250 5,645
F Agricultural Sustainability 
and Enhancement 145 315 315 325 325 1,425
G Local Governance and Police 1,630 120 115 10 - 1.875
Total 11,845 8,910 7,480 3,035 775 32,045
(Summarised from Table 5)
6P r e l u d e  T o  N e a r  D is a s t e r
Burundi, Rwanda, Kagera and Ankole (in Uganda) were, from the end of the 15th Century, 
kingdoms ruled by an invading pastoral minority from the north exercising broadly feudal rule 
over a cultivating majority whom they had conquered. The dominant Tutsi tended to be tall 
and thin; the majority Hutu short and stocky. Relations among the communities varied and by 
the end of the 19th Century the sharpness of cleavages had probably begun to decline, as had 
the Norman-Saxon cleavage in England by 1450. After 1915, Belgian rule in Burundi and 
Rwanda - for complex reasons - greatly exacerbated division and conflict, while British - and 
even more independent Tanzanian - virtually remade Kagera society in the sense o f creating 
both national and regional identities outweighing Hutu/Tutsi cleavages. Ankole was and is 
intermediate with highly ethnic social and political dynamics but not violence.
From independence in 1960 both Rwanda and Burundi have been wracked by ethnic conflict 
up to and including the level of genocide. In Rwanda a Hutu (85%) jacquerie ousted the Tutsi 
elite (and kingship) in 1960-61 with over 300,000 fleeing to Tanzania and Uganda where by 
1990 their numbers had grown to the order of at least 750,000. Further, refugee waves 
probably raised the total external Rwanda Tutsi population as o f 1994 to significantly over 
1,000,000. Most not in Tanzania returned after July 1994 - up to 750,000 projecting late 
1994 Rwanda government statements. Until 1990, Rwanda was a relatively stable state with 
mild to moderate repression of Tutsi plus occasional pogroms. In Burundi, the Tutsi minority 
(15%) held on to power until 1993. It did so at the price o f iron repression and smashing of 
risings or purported risings - with at least one period of genocide in the early 1970s and a total 
1970s loss o f the order of 750,000 lives.
Rwandan refugees in Tanzania were largely integrated into villages o f their own - mostly 
outside Kagera Region for security reasons - and secondarily in urban society. By 
naturalisation and by birth in Tanzania the vast majority are now citizens and only about 6% 
seem to have returned to Rwanda since the RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front) restored Tutsi 
hegemony.
Rwandan refugees in Uganda were largely penned in camps and denied citizenship growing 
hatred, not food and building plots, and not new lives. Repeated re-invasion threats 
destabilised Rwanda to a point and worsened the position of Tutsi's there but were never near 
succeeding. In early 1980 up to 15,000 Rwandans rallied to the cause of Yuweri Museveni 
(by descent of the Rwandan blood royal) and were the core of the army that won the Uganda 
civil w ar for him in 1986. Regrouped as the RPF they invaded their sometime homeland in 
1990. French intervention then and two subsequent, Tanzanian, led compromise peace
II.
#
7initiatives had by March 1994 led to either the verge o f an agreed coalition o f Hutu mainline 
parties - Hutu minority (or moderate) and mixed parties - the RPF, or alternatively to a hard­
line Hutu backlash. When the presidential plane was shot down when landing at Kigali after 
an - apparently successful - peace negotiating meeting violence was rapidly succeeded by 
systematic hard-line Hutu leadership genocide against 'moderate' Hutu (perhaps 150,000) and 
Tutsi (perhaps 350,000). Present Rwanda population estimates of up to 6,000,000 strongly 
suggest the 1,000,000 headline estimate o f death, is not (or not yet) correct but in no way 
mitigate the horror of the 1994 Rwanda holocaust. Inevitably, the RPF responded by 
completing its delayed conquest. While the UN transitional force - the strongest in Kigali - 
could probably have averted both, it chose to see to its own security and passively stood by. 
This scenario of disaster led to the April-June refugee tidal wave and subsequent flows as well 
as to the continued insecurity plus numerous acts of Tutsi vengeance and 'repossession' of 
1959-60 'lost property' (by no means self-evidently even covert let alone overt RPF policy) 
have guaranteed its continuation to date.
The record o f the RPF administration in Rwanda during its first year and the continued 
training o f Interahamwe and ex-Army Tutsi exiles in Zaire and elsewhere do not auger well for 
a transition to peace and reconciliation in Rwanda, to stability in Burundi or to voluntary 
return o f refugees. With official and unofficial detainees already over 50,000 and rising; 
deaths from disease of detainees about 100 a week; no rapid "truth" or trial process probable; 
returned displaced Hutu subject to abuse and 'disappearance' and the government closing 
displaced camps by force (including a near-genocidal sustained killing spree in one case), 
Rwanda is neither peaceful nor stable despite partial economic and government service 
restoration. This interacts with the grim message o f the hard line Hutu who control the 
refugees - "Gun in hand we left our country. Gun in hand we shall return." - to make large 
scale voluntary return in the currently foreseeable future totally impracticable as well as totally 
implausible.
Burundi's last Tutsi dominated military government moved toward reconciliation and free and 
fair elections over 1991-92. The elections were won by a Hutu party and the Tutsi elite 
supported the installation of its elected presidential candidate early in 1993. A lower level 
officer coup murdered him, touched off cross killings and created total disorder for several 
months leading to the 1993 Burundian exodus to Ngara (and also Kigoma) reversed early in 
1994 when a new president took office. His death in the 1994 Kigali plane shooting down 
seriously destabilised Burundi but, to date, a desire to live together rather than die at each 
others' hands has - barely - averted full scale inter communal warfare though not recurrent 
bloody clashes in areas including the governorship adjacent to Ngara.
8Tanzania - and Ngarans in particular - fear new rounds o f conflict in Rwanda and a descent 
into anarchic violence in Burundi. They believe TPDF, about 5,000 in late 1994 but probably 
reinforced in March 1995 to upgrade Burundi border security troops can continue to deter 
spillover fighting and prevent 'return' raids by refugees but know any full scale war with mass 
killing would bring uncontrollable tidal waves of refugees and radically reduce already 
problematic prospects o f return for those now in Kagera Region.
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Tanzania by June 1995 was hosting up to 750,000 Rwandan refugees - almost all in Ngara and 
Karagwe Districts. From March, the always potential danger o f the international food pipeline 
running dry had become alarmingly high. For both humanitarian and security reasons 
Tanzania banned ration cuts from 400 to 160 grams (literally starvation rations). But while it 
could probably physically supply 300 tonnes of grain and beans a day it could not cover the 
$75,000 plus per day cost if the pipeline to WFP ran dry.
Further, promises made in 1994 to hold camps to 25,000 and to move the bulk o f the refugees 
outside Kagera Region were not being met. Bonaco had risen to 250,000 while nobody had 
been relocated. The Tanzanian proposals to the March 1995 Consultative Group in Paris 
(along the lines o f those in this paper) had been sympathetically received, and a laudatory 
statement on Tanzania as host inserted in its communique; but, how many funds would flow 
when, remained unclear.
Further, as the likelihood o f return dimmed, the need to relocate became ever more urgent if 
ecological (and potentially security) catastrophes were to be averted. As a result, in March 
1995 Tanzania temporarily closed its border to Rwandan refugees in Burundi seeking to flee 
again in the face o f rising conflict there. The prospect o f up to 150,000 more refugees with no 
bankable guarantees o f receiving international food support and no foreseeable timetable for 
their return had become unacceptable.
IV.
A p r il -J u n e  1995 F e a r  A n d  D is o r d e r
Rather luckily, late 1993 had seen a build-up of Tanzanian and international refugee support 
(and security) capacity in respect to Burundian refugees. Literally on the eve o f this being
9wound down, the vedettes o f the Hutu exodus poured across the Rusomo Falls bridge, river 
crossing points and the land frontier.
Despite the partial preparation the first weeks were marked by fear, insecurity (at least as to 
property) and chaos for Tanzanians - as well as for refugees. It was over this period that 
virtually the entire maize crop o f up to 100 villages was eaten green (leaving no seed to plant) 
and substantial inroads made into plantains (luckily renewable) and root crops (much less so). 
In addition, school and church furniture and textbooks went to light cooking fires, latrines 
were prematurely filled up, hillsides and water supplies fouled. Camps damaged some crops 
and buildings and herds did the same (until mostly sold to Tanzanians). Initially medical posts 
had their shelves swept bare o f drugs.
However, the greatest impact was fear. Refugees did not - with rare individual exceptions - 
attack Tanzanians. But with the Kagera River clogged with corpses and refugees chopping 
each other in nightly drunken brawls, the fear of the outnumbered villagers was realistic as 
well as real. By September the fear had receded primarily because 5,000 Tanzanian troops 
had been publicly though unobtrusively deployed and perhaps 500 police reinforcements sent 
at an initial year cost of perhaps $10 million and a continuing one o f half as much.
Effective transit camps and transport now whisk refugee arrivals to camps within 48 hours. 
The initial wave - with perhaps 3,000 special exceptions - are all safely (as perceived by 
villagers) in camps. The exceptions are close relatives. In some cases their citizenship is 
probably speculative and in most, Tanzanians have stayed with them in Rwanda (or Burundi) 
in the aftermath of general drought or particular household disasters. The villagers' distinction 
is clear - refugees are unwanted but these are family and by now are probably engaged in 
expanding kibanjas, maintaining houses, restoring latrines.
What has not happened - except for drug supply (UNICEF initiative) and, in part, maize seed 
(domestic church initiative) - is restoration of initial losses. Village efforts have been limited 
by lack of cash. The Sh 150,000 odd to dig, provide pole platforms over and build 
superstructures for the 10 latrines needed by a 750 to 1,250 person village may be only $300 
but it can also be more than villagers' total weekly cash income. The District Councils have no 
funds reallocate to replace textbooks or furniture or for cleansing springs and wells.
Why foreign NGOs (except Caritas and its supplying NGOs via the Catholic Church, to a 
degree the Red Cross via the new Tanzanian Red Cross Chapter in Ngara and - in future intent 
- Oxfam) have not responded is unclear as is the lack of bilateral donor local project funds 
utilisation for programmes well within their scope. Perhaps the agglomeration of these tiny 
'projects' and the much larger infrastructural ones in the 1994 Prime Minister's Office 
Assessment Report resulted in the whole going into 'Head Office' baskets, a procedure starkly
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ill-designed to handle urgent, small cases. Whether a UNICEF initiative for local meetings of 
resident foreign NGOs and bilateral donors with village, district and regional governmental 
and social sector bodies launched at the end of 1994 is - distressingly belatedly - yielding 
results remains to be seen.
V.
C a s h  B a l a n c e , W o r k  O v e r l o a d , C a p it a l  D e p l e t io n
Those three terms sum up the short term refugee impact. So long as the refugees remain, cash 
income gains are likely to equal or slightly outweigh losses. In principle the losses could be 
redressed, leaving net cash gains once market access had been regained.
The work overload aspect is quite different - large, negative, growing so long as the refugees 
remain and substantial for at least five years after they leave. It flows from the increased 
distance necessary to go to collect wood and water with a doubling of population. That is 
already o f the order of one and half hours per household per day (substantially more near the 
refugee camps) and can be expected to rise perhaps on how a year, partly depending on 
whether present water table depletion is local, within a fragmented aquifer system, or more 
general.
Evaluating 18,500 woman years - women and girls are responsible for household fuelling and 
watering - in money terms is hard. $250 a year may be reasonable. This is the minimum wage 
which is well below what most adults earn (in wages or own production). How it will impinge 
is less clear. More work? Less or lower quality food production? Less home care? Reduced 
child care? Loss o f time for secondary earning activities? A combination o f the above? 
Probably the last.
The capital depletion is also basically environmental even if the most immediately visible 
aspect is the destruction of most District roads and the Regional Kigoma-Kyaka-Karagwe- 
Kasulu secondary highway backbone, and delay in completion of the Kasuiu-Ngara-Burundi 
border highway because the contractor has been diverted to camp construction. $20 million 
could restore/complete (actually to a better standard than the partly run down 1993 position) 
and also build in District and Regional maintenance capacity. The environmental capital cost 
o f continued water and wood balance tipping will be larger and both more costly/longer term 
and more problematic to reverse. However, because its success is dependent on rural 
household initiatives its actual cash cost can be substantially lower.
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Netherlands and DTZ (German) programmes on sustainable/improved tree crop, field crop, 
livestock farming and tree renewal look promising but will take time. After several false starts 
(luckily not in Ngara so that potential user views there are not prejudiced by them) the 
technical side of the former seems to be sound and to require primarily use o f best Tanzanian 
practice with limited purchased inputs. Tree planting - in fields, around homesteads as village 
groves is traditional. Nurseries and - for hill slopes - a WFP project (if a suitable commodity 
with low 'wage earner monetisation' costs such as sugar or vegetable oil can be identified or 
wheat sold in urban areas and cash wages paid) plus some cooking technology improvement 
(pioneered elsewhere in Tanzania with DTZ backing) appear to be a viable package. But the 
time span is five years after refugees leave for trees to reach usable branch supply stage.
Food security, nutrition and primary health care have not been stressed because - counter­
intuitively - none is likely to be a major medium term cost of hosting refugees. For the staple 
food (of Ngarans and Rwandans) - plantains - supply is expandable (and new kibanjas are 
being established). For 1995, cassava-potatoes-beans and thereafter cassava-maize-beans- 
potatoes are adequate to bridge the no plantain period unless rains are late or bad (as appears 
not to be the 1995 case).
The Nutrition Centre-Agriculture-Health-Local Government-UNICEF-Community Women’s 
Group alliance for improved child nutrition has, if anything, been stimulated by response to 
crisis. Primary and hospital primary health care burdens of refugees have been, and appear 
likely to continue to be, offset.
Two dangers exist: an epidemic exploding in and escaping from the camps (or a rainy season 
runoff o f dried excrement with the same impact) or a substantial worsening of domestic or 
border security.
The first is real but - except for the sanitation side - containable. Epidemics have to date been 
stamped out in their early stages and the medical structures (including Rwandan in camp 
personnel) for averting them are strengthening. The polluted runoff problem is imponderable - 
heavy initial rains may have reduced risks.
Petty property crimes and, much less frequently, low level personal violence have risen outside 
the camps. Whether Rwandans are directly or indirectly - via the troubling context and the 
example of the camps by night - responsible, is unclear. Ngarans believe they are. A cross- 
border security problem is unlikely so long as the TPDF remains in place. Neither any 
neighbouring army nor the ex-rump regime leaders in the camps would wish to take it on. 
Similarly, violence bursting out of the camps is unlikely because the Rwandans fear the 
Tanzanian army and police. "But no foreigners were injured, no Tanzanians were attacked" is 
the revealing answer to plaints about lack of refugee personal security at night.
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That said, the government shares Ngarans' security concerns. It is well aware the camp 
leaders are hard core Hutu chauvinists. While it has confiscated almost all guns, the same 
cannot be said for pangas (cutlasses) which are needed to build and to cut firewood. Further, 
while it can prevent large scale drilling by day, it cannot totally eliminate it at dusk and dawn. 
However, its greater concerns are o f spill-over violence and/or o f even more massive refugee 
flows if violence in Burundi escalates to state disintegration and/or the exiles reinvade Rwanda 
from Zaire. While it would wish to segregate the hard line leadership (perhaps 500) it views 
this as possible without a blood bath only within a concentration dynamic.
Income distribution impact (see Tables 3 and 4) is mixed and uncertain. Price rises and falls 
are complex (and must be seen against 30% general annual inflation in Tanzania). On the face 
o f it government employees are clear losers and NGO/Agency hires clear gainers. The 
Commercial sector are clear gainers. Farmers are gainers if - and only if - loss o f cash bean 
sales has been offset by sale o f plantains, banana beer and/or wood for fuel or house poles. 
Women are net losers for the work overload reasons cited earlier.
Assuming that no new catastrophes occur and 90% of the refugees leave Kagera (whether 
home or to new village homes elsewhere in Tanzania) by the end of 1995 - a target formally 
endorsed by the key agencies and donors involved, but on which no progress was made 
through April - the expenditure o f about $33 million budgetary resources over five years 
(about half the loss Ngarans and Karagweans will endure over that period) should allow the 
people of the two Districts to make themselves whole again. Evidently pure replication o f 
1993 is unlikely and, if successful, the agricultural and silvicultural initiatives would create a 
more sustainable trend as would those in primary health care and nutrition.
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TABLE 3
REFUGEES AND PRICES: NGARA 1994
(TShillings)
Item January 
(Pre Refugee)
June September
I . Beans (kilo) 200 200 3501
2. M aize meal (kilo) 250 300 400
3. Plantain (plate) 350 400 400
4. Plantain (20 kg stalk) 700-900 2,000 2,500-3,0002
5. Potatoes (leg) 120 300 3502
6. Meal (guest house) 300 400 500
7. Sugar (kg) 350 500 5001
8. Onions (kg) 250-300 400-450 5002
9. Eggs (dozen) 30 60-70 802
10. Banana Beer (litre) 50 303 1002
11. Banana Bear Kasulo 
Camp (20 litre) 4,000 4,500
12. Blankets 7.000 1.000 1,200'
13. Cattle 60.000 5,0004 40,000'
14. Goat 4,000 3,0004 4.000-6,5002
15. Beer (Primus) 350 500 6002
16. Firewood (3 pieces) 10 15-40 20-502
17. Building Pole (piece) 110 150 150
18. Charcoal (sack) 800 1.500-1.800 1,5002
Notes:
1 Well below typical rural price.
2 Well above typical rural price.
3 Peak banana harvest season.
4 Peak refugee sales.
Sources: District Officers, Ngara traders, rural customers - September, 1994.
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TABLE 4
A. 1994-5 REFUGEE CO STS1: NGARA PLUS KARAGWE
1. Initial Village Impact
a. Food and Seed
b. Damages - Schools, latrines, etc.
c. Drugs Used
$1,050,000
$100,000
$20,000
2. Transport Cost - Road and Market Loss 
a. Lost Sales $3,000,000
b. Higher Costs $500,000
3. Medical Services
Net Diversion of Services $125,000
4. Fuel and Water
Workload (at $250/women, year) $4,875,000
5. Agricultural Production
Land Loss and Degradation $250,000
Total $9,920,000
B. 1994-5 REFUGEE RELATED INCOME GAINS
1. Salaries from Agencies $500,000
2. Sales of Bananas $3,000,000
3. Other Sales to Refugees $500,000
4. Sales o f Local Goods, Services Plus Trade M argins 
to Expatriates $1,500,000
Total $5,500,000
Note: 1 Excludes Security expenditure, probably of the order of $10,000,000 in 1994-5.
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TABLE 5
PROGRAMME COSTS:. 1994-1999
($000)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
A Initial Village Impact 750 - - - - 750
Reversal1
B Transport Rehabilitation
Emergency2 4,800 - - - - 4,800
Highway Completion (3) - - - - (3)
District Roads 2,000 3,000 3,500 - - 8,500
Kasulo - Kvaka 1,000 3,000 1,250 (1.500)4 - (6,750)4
Sub Total 7.800 6,000 4,750 (1.500) (-) (20.050)4
C Health1
Primary Health Care 250s 100 100 100 100 650
CSDP 100 100 100 100 100 500
Tanzania Red Cross 25 25 - - - 50
Sub Total 375 225 200 200 200 1,200
D W ater1
Camp Use Offset 100 - - - - 100
Rehabilitation/Cleansing 25 125 - - - 150
Additional Wells 150 350 350 - - 850
Sub Total 275 475 350 - - 1,100
E Forestrv/Agro-Forestry
Initial Actions2 95 - - - - 95
Fuel Efficiency 25 25 - - - 50
Seedling/Agro-Forestry - 250 250 250 250 1,000
Protection Planting (e.g. 750 1,500 1,500 750 - 4,500
WFP)
Sub Total 870 1,775 1,750 1,000 250 5.645
F Agricultural Sustainability
and Enhancement6
Core Programme 100 250 250 250 250 1,100
Coffee 20 40 40 50 50 200
Rural Technology 25 25 25 25 25 125
Sub Total 145 315 315 325 325 1,425
G Local Government and Police
Initial2 675 - - - - 675
Police 700 100 100 - - 900
Police Post 150 - - - - 150
Allowances 50 - - - - 50
Rehabilitation/Equipment 30 - - - - 30
Recurrent 25 20 15 10 - 70
Sub Total 1.630 120 115 10 - 1,875
Total9 11,845 8,910 7,480 3,035 775 32,045
Notes:
] Includes Assessment Report items somewhat reorganised and expanded.
2 Direct from Assessment Report.
3 Presumed to be already funded by EU.
4 Regional Works equipment parks for maintenance if road constructed by contractor.
5 Includes Rural Health Centre at Kasulo.
6 Very hypothetical order of magnitude guidelines.
7 Additional officers for 1994 and 1995 in 1995.
Service allowances for 1994 and 1995 (assumes 50,000 refugees by end 1995).
Does not include salaries and related expenses of any full time expatriates. These would cost about 
$150,000 - $175,000 per person year. It is not evident that - outside of perhaps agriculture and 
forestry - any need for additional full time expatriates arises within the proposals.
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VI.
In  T h e  L o n g  R u n  ...
Whether the long run builds from a restored base or spirals downward out of control depends 
primarily on four factors:
1. rapid refugee resettlement outside Kagera Region;
2. adequate and sustained donor support for the funding needs outlined in Table 5 (and for 
refugee support which came into serious question by early 1995) and Tanzanian provision 
of army and police security forces indefinitely (i.e. until both Burundi and Rwanda are 
clearly stable);
3. general economic and public service recovery in Tanzania;
4. no massive new catastrophes in Rwanda or Burundi (which would o f course prevent No. 
1).
The last is beyond the scope of the present paper but seems a little better than 50-50 
probability. The second will be clearer when interim and full Consultative Group pledges for 
1995 are known. Barring total failure on the third front, the Tanzanian security shield 
provision will occur.
Everybody is agreed the refugees should leave Kagera soon. Everybody is agreed their 
voluntary return to Rwanda is optimal. That, however, is a dangerously Panglossian view if 
taken to mean the absence o f very major problems.
The refugees will not return to Rwanda voluntarily under present or readily foreseeable 
circumstances. So long as the dead boat brings in a daily haul from the Kagera and wounded 
refugees continue to arrive, rumours (some at least true) o f persecution o f innocent Hutu and 
attempts to recreate 1959 social and ownership patterns flow in, the threat o f unending less 
than impartial trials o f scores of thousands for genocide remains (and over 250 suspects die 
each month in prison), the RPF is unable to establish law, order, or full basic service 
restoration as well as a credible non-communal face (to replace what seems to many to be a 
Tutsi returnee face ornamented with moderate Hutu), so long will voluntary repatriation be 
minimal. Optimistically that suggests until 1998 or 2000.
In that case resettlement elsewhere in Tanzania in villages where food can be grown and new 
lives built is the least bad alternative. Tanzania is not enthusiastic. Refugees in large numbers 
are, at least initially, not popular neighbours unless relatives, and 1995 is an election year. But 
Tanzania would not refuse and has virtually (if not openly to date) accepted that mass 1995
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voluntary return is not on. For security reasons (and its happy experience with 1959-60 
refugees) it certainly would prefer 4,000 person villages to 100,000 person camps. Indeed in 
1994 it thought it had international commitment to camps of not over 25,000 each and at least 
four-fifths outside Kagera.
UNHCR apparently agrees early large scale voluntary return is unlikely and - at least at field 
level - that villages are better than camps. However, donors are certain, at best, to gulp and 
perhaps to baulk at the roughly $250 million bill for resettlement in villages and Tanzania to 
meditate on the probable permanent 'acquisition' of most of the refugees (again on 1959-60 
experience) when good land is now relatively scarce in many parts o f the country.
To that there are no easy answers - or rather the easy answers that more funding of prevention 
in Rwanda and a less self-serving UN force reaction after the assassinations would have saved 
hundreds o f millions of dollars as well as hundreds of thousands o f lives, do not help Ngarans 
or Karagweans (or donors) now nor offer much help in outlining how to avert future crises.
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A n n e x
N g a r a : E c o n o m y , P o l it y , G o v e r n a n c e  O n  T h e  P e r ip h e r y
Ngara District is literally on the periphery o f Tanzania adjoining both Burundi and Rwanda but 
with very difficult access to the Regional city o f Bukoba and the rest o f West Lake Region, to 
the Lake Zone metropolis of Mwanza and especially to the capital Dar es Salaam which is two 
days hard drive away. Until 25 years ago it was almost unpopulated. Even rapid growth from 
the 1970s has left the estimated 1993 population under 200,000 (at least 85% rural in villages 
and perhaps 15% in small towns - Ngara and Rulenge). Distance and lack o f access have 
made it a poor district, at least in terms o f cash income. Physical and psychological distance 
from the capital mean it is less well provided with public services than average. While 
Christian medical services are relatively strong, Christian secondary schools are not.
A g r ic u l t u r e  a n d  F o o d  S e c u r it y
Agriculturally Ngara has no absolute land shortage, albeit much o f the land is o f medium to 
low potential and/or subject to erosion because of the pattern o f high hills and relatively steep 
valley slopes. It has above typical Tanzanian rainfall in normal years (over one metre) but is 
subject to droughts with 1993-94 having been a moderate drought year but 1994-95 relatively 
good. The core o f agriculture is the banana (especially plantain) crop grown in arduously 
prepared kibanjas, followed by root crops (sweet and Irish potatoes with cassava as a drought 
security fallback), beans and - at some distance - coffee. There is a substantial livestock 
component - basically cattle - in the agricultural sector; a component which is symbiotic with 
crops because manure is integral to kibanja establishment and maintenance.
Agricultural sustainability problems have been growing over the past decade. Continuous use 
of kibanjas (combined with burning leaves not using them as mulch as - e.g. - in the 
Kilimanjaro/Arusha zone) has reduced soil fertility and resistance to nematodes and weevils. 
Increased herds and continued grass and post harvest stalk burning have increased erosion as 
has the gradual reduction of tree and bush cover in the face of rising fuel and building material 
needs and the absence of systematic replanting. However, attainable shifts in farming systems 
would appear adequate to restore balance in both soil fertility and land cover.
Except in drought years food security is probably relatively good. It appears likely that at 
least 90% of households can and do grow their own basic food supply and most o f the others 
engage in some food growing and/or have close family links with those who do. As a result 
local staple food sales are very low even in Ngara town. Under Five malnutrition has been 
moderately above the national average but not among the highest. It is now declining under
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the influence o f the nutrition-health-women's initiative programme. Growing population and 
increasing erosion/soil degradation may have been putting this relatively satisfactory position 
at risk; continued presence o f 350,000 to 400,000 refugees certainly will have that result.
A low proportion o f agricultural output is commercialised because of limited district demand 
and poor access to more distant markets - except Kigali. Ngara market is notable for the 
limited amount o f district produced food (except for the adjacent butcher's shop) even though 
it is relatively well supplied with basic consumer goods (e.g. textiles, shoes, pots-pans-jars) as 
well as spices-cooking oil-sugar-tea. The two main cash crops are coffee (declining at least 
until very recently) and beans. Coffee procurement by the Kagera Cooperative Union was late 
and desultory resulting in smuggling to Rwanda and Burundi and, with low prices in much o f 
the 1980s and 1990s, falling production. Beans came to be the dominant cash crop (in 
addition to their long-standing role as a basic food crop) in the 1980s (perhaps 2,500-4,000 
tonnes and $2.5 to $4 million by early 1990s) with sales primarily to Rwanda and secondarily 
to Burundi. As o f 1994 the coffee price had improved and a District Co-operative had been 
formed, selling - initially - direct to Tanica (the Bukoba instant coffee company). Beans sales - 
and prices - had collapsed with the loss o f the Rwanda and crippling of the Burundi markets 
plus a local glut from refugees trading beans for plantations, banana beer and potatoes which 
raised markets and prices for these crops. Only completion of the Ngara-Kasulo highway link 
can make more distant bean sales in Tanzania in normal years viable despite the relatively 
strong national urban market demand. It would also improve access to the Burundi market.
Reinforcement o f food security and overall sustainable agricultural output will take time - both 
knowledge and personnel are currently limited - but appear practicable. As noted in the case 
o f mulching, district practices (both in respect to banana and coffee) are well below best 
Tanzanian rural practice. Systematic household and village tree replanting, like use o f banana 
leaves and other agricultural by-products for supplementing grazing for cattle in more densely 
populated areas, have yet to be promoted.
P o v e r t y  - E x t r e m e  o r  O v e r s t a t e d ?
Kagera Region is poor but how poor is controversial. On some studies it ranks 19 of 20 
mainland Tanzania and in some at the bottom of the top third. In part this may reflect the 
relative absence o f upper middle or high income households, which lowers the average but 
also the share o f the population in absolute poverty. Comparisons are difficult because 
household self-provisioning is valued at local prices which are perhaps a third of those in main 
urban areas which distorts any welfare test (a kilo of beans or plantains is worth as much for
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food security or basic needs satisfaction if consumed in a Ngara village as in Kariakoo ward o f 
Dar es Salaam!).
Ngara villages and Ngara town are poor but do not appear notably so by rural Tanzanian or 
rural African standards. Malnutrition does not stare the observer in the face; the town market 
has supplies (and customers) suggesting that goods beyond food are affordable to many; the 
houses (basically pole plastered with mud and thatched) are not hovels, albeit local brick 
production to date appears to be limited and technologically weak by rural Tanzanian 
standards. In the town and at the market most adults wear sandals or plastic shoes although in 
villages and among children the proportion decline sharply (20% at a village primary school) - 
about the same as suburban Blantyre and above rural Malawian or peripheral rural Ghanaian 
levels.
P u b l ic  S e r v ic e s  - C o p in g  a n d  C u t t in g
Public services exist at levels above those typical in peripheral (and some not so peripheral) 
rural African districts. However, they are clearly under severe pressure. That is a general 
Tanzanian phenomenon because the 1979-1983 decline in output per capita fell mainly on 
savings and public services while personal consumption per capita stagnated but - especially in 
most rural areas - did not fall dramatically and the 1984-93 recovery has gone largely to 
personal consumption and only secondarily to restoring public services (or savings).
Primary schools, hospitals (3) and dispensaries exist and function. District technical posts are 
filled - most with competent, hard working officers. However, agricultural extension, water 
and works (roads/public buildings) are not funded to levels adequate to maintain existing 
levels, let alone snap back after crises. The weakness of government services has been 
escalated by the low cash income (limiting community contributions) and the relative absence 
o f other outside support (the Catholic Diocese and Caritas, the Amglican Diocese and the 
Tanzanian Christian Council plus UNICEF, and, more recently, AMREF, GTZ and 
Netherlands aid being the exceptions cited).
As with agriculture and food security the pre-refugee situation was unsatisfactory. It was not 
or not yet at crisis point but under increasing stress and, in the services case, probably 
gradually deteriorating. The mystery of a relatively dynamic District government despite most 
staff receiving (as of late 1994) salaries of $20-50 a month appears to be threefold:
a. most public service employees (or more accurately their wives) do grow most o f their own 
food and build/maintain their own houses;
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b. there is an expectation of public service delivery both by public servants and by 
communities resulting in both community and internalised pressure to fulfil it;
c. communities do 'top up' salaries o f public servants seen to deliver desired services with 
food, house building and some cash.
P o l it ic a l  - T h e  M e a n in g f u l  F l a g  a n d  B o r d e r
The most startling fact about Ngara District is likely to escape any observer without local 
historical background. It was part o f the old Kagera Kingdom which like Rwanda, Burundi 
(and Ankole) was one of the Tutsi ruler/Hutu majority Interlake kingdoms. Until 1915 it was 
part o f German East Africa administered together with Rwanda and Burundi from which it 
was not then seen as radically different.
Today matters are very different. Few people in Ngara or Karagwe (or Kagera Region in 
general) identify primarily as Tutsi or Hutu. "Tanzanian", (and secondarily "Wahaya") are the 
typical responses and attitudes. Tensions and conflicts exist but, on wealth, access to officials, 
incomer/old resident lines and at levels which are very low by African standards and a world 
away from Burundi, let alone Rwanda. Ngara District is very peaceful - one of the villagers' 
most intense feelings about refugees was amazed horror at how violent they were to each 
other. The could not conceive why quarrels after drinking should lead to regular resort to 
pangas (machetes) and promptly called out the Sungu-Sungu (village voluntary militia cum 
police) even though the refugees were careful not to attack Tanzanians. Crimes o f theft and 
violence in Ngara have risen in 1994 (quite apart from night violence in Benaco Camp leading 
to 4 to 10 murders most nights, some but not all political) - at least double the rate for the 
whole o f Tanzania. This is universally attributed to refugees or their disturbing impact on 
Tanzanian youths. (Karagwe has rather more crime than Ngara, in particular road banditry. 
While usually attributed to Ugandan influences because violent rural banditry has been 
endemic there for at least half a century, this feature of Karagwe long predates 1994.)
In part that change was an achievement o f British colonial policy, but it has been greatly 
consolidated and deepened by independent Tanzania and solidified by the Amin invasion and 
the visions o f horror across the borders.
Ngarans have relatives in Burundi and Rwanda and in that sense the borders are artificial. But 
in political and social terms the borders are very real indeed and - like their flag flapping at the 
border posts, both to reassure and to warn off - are meaningful to Ngarans and Karagweans. 
Tanzania is a nation state and on the north-west periphery that fact is, as o f 1994, an especially 
relevant and reassuring one to its citizens.
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Politics in more conventional senses is not prominent. One or two opposition parties have 
members with offices in their houses in Ngara, but on the whole multi partyism is not an issue. 
The disasters across the border have probably reinforced that - the police and troops they 
needed came from the government, as did the increased presence of the Regional 
Commissioner and the selective strengthening o f key District posts. At rural or small town 
level the government and the majority party tend to be seen as one. The opposition is 
perceived as a set o f critics of what the government as such does, not simply o f  the majority 
party; a perception not notably adding to other parties' appeal in Ngara or Karagwe in 1994 
when they appear to have polled under 5% with no seats in local government elections (versus 
20% to 25% and 4% respectively nationally).
S o u r c e  N o t e
This paper is based primarily on the 1994 Tanzania Prime Minister's Office Assessment Report 
and 1994 study by the author in Dar es Salaam and Ngara. The latter led to UNICEF's That 
They May Be Whole Again: Offsetting Refugee Influx Burdens On Ngara And Karagwe 
Districts. General sources on Ngara-Karagwe and references to them on country-wide studies 
are limited. Special note should be made of the background data on Kagera Region's rural 
economy in several works by Professor Anna Tibaijuka of the University o f Dar es Salaam.
The proposals and analysis o f this paper are the author's responsibility and are not necessarily 
identical to those of UNICEF or o f the United Republic of Tanzania.
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W e co u ld  n o t u n d e rs tan d  p eo p le  
w h o  w e re  so  v io len t to  each  o th e r  
W e  had  to  call o u t th e  su n g u -su n g u  
ev ery  night
-  N g a ra  V illage L ead er
T h e  re fu g ees  a te  all th e  m aize w h ile  it 
w a s  still g re e n  T h e re  w as  no  see d  I have 
g o tte n  10 to n n e s  from  th e  C o u n cil o f  C h u rch es  
T o d a y  I g o  to  o n e  v illage  to  see  h o w  V illage 
E x e c u tiv e  O fficer's  d is trib u tio n  o f  10 kilos 
to  each  h o useho ld  is go ing .
- D io cese  o f  K agera, 
D ev e lo p m en t C an o n
T o  p lan  is to  choose .
C h o o se  to  g o  fo rw ard
M w alim u  Ju liu s  K. N y e re re
I.
H o s t i n g  H o a r d s  O n  T h e  F a r  P e r i p h e r y : A n  O v e r v i e w
N g a ra  and  K a ra g w e  D is tric ts  in T an zan ia 's  K a g e ra  R eg io n  on  th e  b o rd e rs  o f  R w a n d a  and  
B u ru n d i a re  fa r p e rip h e ry  - no t on ly  from  E u ro p e  bu t a lso  from  D a r es  S a laam  T hey  a re  
am o n g  T a n zan ia 's  m ost iso la ted , least k n o w n  an d  lo w est cash  in co m e d is tr ic ts  a lth o u g h  on  
n u tri tio n  and  o th e r  socia l p a ra m e te rs  th ey  m ay  ran k  in th e  m idd le  th ird . N g a ra  in p a rticu la r 
h as had  rap id  p o p u la tio n  g ro w th  since  th e  la te  1960s b e cau se  o f  th e  availab ility  o f  re la tive ly  , 
fe rtile  land , less  d ro u g h t risk  th an  fo r m ost o f  th e  L ak e  zo n e  and  im p ro v in g  acce ss  to  w a te r , 
san ita tio n , p rim ary  e d u ca tio n  and h ealth  care.
S ince  la te  1993 th e  50 0 ,0 0 0  o dd  re s id en ts  o f  th e se  tw o  d is tric ts  h av e  h o s ted  o f  th e  o rd e r  o f  
8 0 0 ,0 0 0  R w an d an  and  B urund ian  re fu g ees  T h e  first B u ru n d ian  w av e  re tu rn ed  h o m e w hen  
c o n d itio n s  b e ca m e  less fraugh t at hom e bu t w e re  a lm ost in stan tly  su cceed ed  by  th e  R w andan
2lidal w a v e  fo llo w in g  [he a ssa ss in a tio n  o f  the  P res id en ts  o f  R w an d a  an d  B urund i, th e  p o litico - 
e th n ic  g e n o c id e  w hich  en sued  an d  th e  inexo rab le  ad v an ce  o f  th e  inv ad in g  (s ince  1990) fo rce s  
o f  th e  R w an d a  P a trio tic  F ro n t w h o  becam e  th e  co u n try 's  ru le rs  by July. A s o f  L en t 1995, the  
R w an d an  and  ren ew ed  B u ru n d ian  re fu g ee  to ta l w as  nearing  6 0 0 ,0 0 0  w ith  a rriva ls  o v e r th e  last 
six m o n th s  o f  50  to  2 ,0 0 0  a d a y  (m an y  w o u n d e d ) o u ts trip p in g  v o lu n ta ry  official and  unofficial 
re tu rn s  a v e rag in g  pe rh ap s  25  a  day.
T h e  re fu g e e s  a re  h oused  in sev e ra l h uge  cam ps - the  la rgest, B o n aco , n e a r  th e  R u so m o  Falls 
b rid g e  to  R w an d a , nearly  2 0 0 ,0 0 0  O n e  very  sm all ( 1,4 0 0 ) c am p  a tte s ts  to  the  in tense  e th n ic  
c le av a g e  in R w an d a . All m em b ers  o f 'm ix e d ' F fu tu -T utsi re fu g ee  fam ilies a re  there . B o th  the  
n u m b er - ba re ly  o n e -q u a rte r  p e r  c e n t o f  all re fu g ees  - and th e  need  to  iso la te  (an d  g u a rd  - no t 
a lw ay s  100%  successfu lly ) them , speak  fo r them selves.
T h is  p a p e r 's  cen tra l co n ce rn  is n o t th e  cam ps n o r the  re fu g ees  b u t th e  im pact on  N g a ra n s  
(o u tn u m b e re d  tw o  to  one by re fu g e e s)  and K a rag w ean s  (w ith  a b o u t th e  inverse  ra tio )
T h e  im p ac t falls in to  th ree  g ro u p in g s : th e  initial tidal w av e  influx; th e  c ash  incom e acce ss  
n e x u s  and  th e  en v iro n m en ta l c o s ts . T h e  first and  last a re  v irtually  to ta lly  n egative; th e  seco n d  
w ith  la rg e  (re la tiv e  to  D is tric t c ash  incom e) p lu sses  and  m inuses  p ro b ab ly  c ro ss -can ce ll in g  at 
m a c ro  level b u t in w ays sh iftin g  and  increasing  inequality  o f  in co m e  d is trib u tio n .
T h e  initial im p ac t w as  one  o f  te r ro r ,  d ea th  s ta lked  R w an d a  and  until th e  d ep lo y m en t o f  
T an zan ian  t ro o p s  and  re in fo rcem e n t o f  police , th e re  w a s  g re a t fe a r it w o u ld  c ro ss  th e  c o rp s e -  
c lo g g e d  R u so m o  R iver, th e  sc ru b  field  land b o u n d a ry  w ith  R w an d a , o r  th e  ro ad  m ed ian  and  
hill c re s t line  w ith  B urund i.
B ey o n d  te r ro r  (a n d  te rro r is in g  by  th e ir  v io len t b eh av io u r to  e ach  o th e r , th o u g h  ra re ly  to  
T an z a n ian s ), th e  re fu g ees  a c te d  in w ays a n a lo g o u s  to  a  h o rd e  o f  lo cu sts . H ungry , they  
b o u g h t, b a rte re d  o r  to o k  m aize , p lan ta in s, beans  and  cassav a . N e e d in g  to  c o o k , th ey  sw e p t up  
tex t b o o k s , sch o o l fu rn itu re  and  ch u rch  benches. C am p in g  in h u g e  num bers , th ey  d a m ag ed  
tre e  and  field c ro p s . W ith  a d iffe ren t san itary  trad itio n , they  filled v illage  la trines  (n ea r 
u n iv e rsa l in m o s t o f  N g a ra )  an d  fo u led  h illsides and  w a te r  so u rces . Ill and  su ffering  from  
ex h au s tio n , th ey  u se d  up  d isp en sa rie s ' m o d est d ru g  s to ck s .
T h e  to ta l c o s ts  lo o k  low  - s lig h tly  o v e r  SI m illion (see  T a b le  1) fo r  100  b o rd e r  an d  tra n s it 
v illages o r  $ 1 0 ,0 0 0  p e r v illage  S e t a gain st p e rh ap s  $ 5 0 0  to  $ 7 5 0  w eek ly  to ta l c ash  in co m es 
o f  re s id en ts  o f  m o s t v illages and  th e  s len d er re so u rc es  o f  local g o v e rn m e n t and  b o th  loca l and 
n a tio n a l socia l s e c to r  (in  th e se  D is tric ts  p rim arily  C ath o lic , A ng lican  and  L u th e ran  C h u rch es , 
c o -o p e ra tiv e  so c ie tie s  and th e  w o m e n 's  g ro u p s  re la tin g  to  child  n u tr i tio n -h ea lth -lo ca l in itia tiv es  
p ro g ra m m e ) th o s e  sum s a c q u ire  K ilim an ja ro esq u e  d im ensions
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P R O G R A M M E  C O S T : 1995-1999 
(SOOO al 1994 Prices)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
A Initial V illage Impact 
Reversal
750 - - - - 750
B T ransport Rehabilitation 7.X00 6.000 4.750 1.500 - 20.000
C H ealth 375 225 200 200 200 1.200
D W ater 275 475 350 - - 1.100
E Forest rv/A pro-Forest ry 870 1.775 1.750 1.000 250 5.645
F A gricultural Sustainability 
and Enhancem ent 145 315 315 315 315 1.405
G Local G overnance and Police 1.630 120 115 10 - 1.875
T otal 11,845 8,910 7,480 3,025 765 32,025
(Sum m arised from Table 5)
6U.
P r e l u d e  T o  N e a r  D i s a s t e r
B u ru n d i, R w an d a , K agera  and  A n k o le  (in U g an d a) w ere , from  th e  end  o f  th e  15th C en tu ry , 
k in g d o m s ru led  by  an  invad ing  p a sto ra l m inority  from  th e  n o rth  e x erc isin g  b ro ad ly  feudal ru le  
o v e r  a  cu ltiv a tin g  m ajority . T h e  d o m in an t T u tsi tended  to  be  tall an d  th in , th e  m a jo rity  H u tu  
sh o rt and  s to ck y . R ela tio n s  am o n g  th e  co m m u n itie s  varied  and by th e  end o f  th e  19th C e n tu ry  
th e  sh arp n ess  o f  c leav ag es  had  p ro b a b ly  b egun  to  decline. A fte r 1915, B elg ian  ru le  in B u ru n d i 
and R w an d a  - fo r com plex  re a so n s  - g rea tly  ex ace rb a ted  d iv ision  and  con flic t, w hile  B ritish  - 
and  e ven  m o re  in d ep en d en t T a n za n ian  - v irtually  rem ade  K agera  so c ie ty  in th e  sen se  o f  
c re a tin g  b o th  n a tiona l and reg io n a l iden tities  o u tw e ig h in g  H u tu /T u ts i c leavages.
F rom  in d e p e n d en ce  in I9 6 0  b o th  R w an d a  and B urund i h ave  been  w rack ed  by e thn ic  conflic t 
up  to  and  includ ing  th e  level o f  g e n o c id e  In R w an d a  a H u tu  (8 5 % ) ja c q u e r ie  o u s ted  th e  T u ts i 
elite  (and  k in g sh ip ) in 1960-61 w ith  o v e r  3 0 0 ,0 0 0  fleeing  to  T an zan ia  and  U g an d a  w h e re  by 
1990 th e ir  n u m b ers  had g ro w n  to  th e  o rd e r  o f  7 5 0 ,000 . U ntil 1990, R w an d a  w as  a re la tively  
stab le  s ta te  w ith  m ild to m o d e ra te  rep re ss io n  o f  T u tsi p lus oc ca s io n a l p o g ro m s. In  B urund i, 
th e  T u tsi m in o rity  (1 5 % ) held  on  to  p o w e r  until 1993. It did so  a t th e  p rice  o f  iron  rep ressio n  
and  sm ash ing  o f  ris ings o r  p u rp o r te d  ris ings - w ith  at least o n e  p e rio d  o f  g en o c id e  in th e  early  
1970s and  a to ta l 1970s lo ss  o f  th e  o rd e r  o f  7 5 0 ,0 0 0  lives.
R w an d a n  re fu g ees  in T an za n ia  w e re  largely  in teg ra ted  in to  v illages o f  the ir o w n  - m ostly  
o u ts id e  K a g era  R eg io n  fo r se c u rity  re a so n s  - and  secondarily  in u rb an  socie ty . By 
n a tu ra lisa tio n  and  by  birth  in T a n zan ia  th e  vast m ajority  a re  now  c itiz en s  and  on ly  a b o u t 6%  
seem  to  h ave  re tu rn e d  to  R w an d a  s in ce  th e  R P F  (R w an d a  P a trio tic  F ro n t)  re s to re d  T utsi 
hegem ony .
R w an d an  re fu g e es  in U g an d a  w e re  la rge ly  p enned  in c am p s  and  d en ied  c itizen sh ip  g ro w in g  
ha tred , n o t fo o d  an d  bu ild ing  p lo ts , and  no t new  lives. R ep ea ted  re -in v asio n  th rea ts  
d estab ilised  R w an d a  to  a p o in t and  w o rsen ed  th e  p o sitio n  o f  T u tsi's  th e re  b u t w e re  n ev er near 
su cceed in g  In early  1980 u p  to  15 ,000  R w andans rallied to  th e  c au se  o f  Y u w eri M useven i 
(by  d e sc e n t o f  th e  R w an d an  b lo o d  ro y a l) and  w e re  th e  c o re  o f  th e  a rm y  th a t w o n  th e  U g an d a  
civil w a r  fo r him  in 1986 R e g ro u p e d  a s  th e  R P F  they  invaded  th e ir  so m etim e  hom eland  in 
1990. F rench  in te rv en tio n  th e n  and  tw o  subseq u en t T anzan ian , led c o m p ro m ise  p eace  
in itia tives, had  by  M arch  1994 led to  e ith e r th e  v e rg e  o f  an  ag reed  co a litio n  o f  H u tu  m ainline 
p a rtie s  - H u tu  m ino rity  (o r  m o d e ra te )  and  m ixed parties  - th e  R P F , o r  to  a  hard -line  H u tu  
back lash  W hen th e  p res id en tia l p lane  w as  sh o t dow n  w hen  land ing  a t K igali a fte r an, 
ap p aren tly  successfu l, p eace  n e g o tia tin g  m eeting  v io lence  w as rap id ly  su cceed ed  by  system a tic  
ha rd -lin e  H u tu  leadersh ip  g e n o c id e  again st 'm o d era te ' H u tu  (p e rh ap s  150 ,000 ) and  T u tsi
C a s h  B a l a n c e , W o r k  O v e r l o a d , C a p i t a l  D e p l e t i o n
T h o se  th ree  te rm s sum  u p  th e  sh o rt te rm  re fu g ee  im pact S o  lo n g  as th e  re fu g ees  rem ain , c ash  
incom e  gains a re  likely to  eq u al o r  s lightly  o u tw e ig h  lo sses  In p rinc ip le  th e  lo sses  co u ld  be 
re d re ssed , leav ing  net cash  g a in s  o n c e  m ark e t acce ss  had been  rega ined
T h e  w o rk  o v e rlo ad  asp ec t is q u ite  d iffe ren t - la rge , n e g a tiv e , g ro w in g  so  long  as th e  re fu g ees  
rem ain  and  substan tia l fo r at least five y e a rs  a f te r  they  leave  It f lo w s from  th e  increased  
d is ta n ce  necessa ry  to  g o  to  c o lle c t w o o d  and  w a te r  w ith  a d o u b lin g  o f  p o p u la tio n . T h a t is 
a lready  o f  the o rd e r  o f  o n e  and  h a lf  h o u rs  p e r h o u seh o ld  per day  (su b stan tia lly  m o re  n ear the  
re fu g e e  cam ps) and  can  b e  e x p e c te d  to  rise  p e rh ap s  on  h o w  a  year, partly  d ep en d in g  on  
w h e th e r p resen t w a ter ta b le  d e p le tio n  is local, w ith in  a  frag m en ted  aq u ife r sy stem , o r  m o re  
gen era l
E v a lu a tin g  1 8 ,500  w om an  y e a rs  - w o m en  and  g irls a re  re sp o n sib le  fo r h o u seh o ld  fuelling  and  
w a te r in g  - in m any te rm s is h a rd  $ 2 5 0  a  y e a r  m ay be rea so n ab le  T h is  is the  m inim um  w a g e  
w h ich  is w ell b e lo w  w ha t m o s t a d u lts  earn  (in  w a g es  o r o w n  p ro d u c tio n )  H o w  it w ill im p inge  
is less  c lear M o re  w o rk ?  L ess o r  lo w er q u a lity  food  p ro d u c tio n ?  L ess h o m e  care?  R ed u ced  
child  care?  L o ss  o f  tim e fo r se c o n d a ry  earn in g  ac tiv itie s?  A co m b in a tio n  o f  th e  above?
T h e  cap ital d ep le tio n  is a lso  b asica lly  en v iro n m en ta l even  i f  th e  m o s t im m ed ia te ly  v isib le  
asp ec t is th e  d e stru c tio n  o f  m o s t D is tr ic t ro a d s  and  th e  R eg io n al K ig o m a-K y ak a-K arag w e- 
K asu lu  sec o n d a ry  h ighw ay  b a ck b o n e , and  de lay  in c o m p le tio n  o f  th e  K asu lu -N g a ra -B u ru n d i 
h ig h w ay  b e ca u se  the  c o n tra c to r  h a s  b een  d iv e rte d  to  cam p  c o n s tru c tio n  $ 2 0  m illion c o u ld  
re s to re /c o m p le te  (ac tu a lly  to  a b e t te r  s tan d a rd  th an  th e  p a rtly  run  d o w n  1993 p o s itio n ) and  
build  in D istric t and  R eg io n al m a in te n an c e  capac ity . T h e  e n v iro n m en ta l c ap ita l co st o f  
c o n tin u ed  w a te r  and w o o d  b a la n c e  tip p in g  will b e  la rg e r and  b o th  m o re  c o stly /lo n g er te rm  and  
m o re  p ro b le m a tic  to  rev e rse .
N e th e rlan d s  and  D T Z  (G e rm a n ) p ro g ra m m e s  o n  su sta in ab le /im p ro v ed  tre e  c ro p , field  c ro p , 
liv e s to ck  fa rm ing  and tre e  re n e w al lo o k  p ro m isin g  b u t w ill ta k e  tim e. A fte r  several fa lse  s ta r ts  
(luck ily  not in N g a ra  so  th a t p o te n tia l u se r  v iew s th e re  a re  n o t p re ju d iced  by  them ) th e  
techn ica l side o f  the fo rm er see m s to  be so u n d  and  to  re q u ire  p rim arily  u se  o f b e s t  T a n z a n ian  
p rac tic e  w ith  lim ited p u rc h a se d  in p u ts  T re e  p lan tin g  - in fields, a ro u n d  h o m e stea d s  a s  v illage  
g ro v e s  is trad itiona l N u rse r ie s  an d  - fo r hill s lo p es  - a  W F P  p ro jec t ( i f  a su itab le  c o m m o d ity  
w ith  low  'w a g e  ea rn e r m o n e tisa tio n ' c o s ts  such  a s  s u g a r  o r  v e g e ta b le  oil c an  be  iden tified  o r 
w h eat sold in u rban  a re a s  and  ca sh  w a g es  p a id ) p lu s  so m e  c o o k in g  te c h n o lo g y  im p ro v em en t
(p io n e e re d  e lsew h e re  in T an zan ia  w ith  D T Z  b ack in g ) a p p ea r to  be a v iab le  p a ck a g e  B u t the 
tim e span  is five y ea rs  a f te r  re fu g ees  leave  fo r tre e s  to  reach  usab le  b ran ch  supp ly  s tag e
F o o d  secu rity , n u tritio n  and  p rim ary  hea lth  c a re  have not been s tre ssed  b e ca u se  - c o u n te r ­
in tu itively  - n o n e  is likely to  be  a  m a jo r m ed ium  te rm  co st o f  h o sting  re fu g ees  F o r th e  s tap le  
food  ( o f  N g a ra n s  and R w an d an s), supp ly  is exp an d ab le  (and  new  kiban jas a re  be ing  
e stab lish ed ) F o r 1995, c as s av a -p o ta to e s -b e a n s  and th e rea fte r c a s s a v a -m a iz e -b e an s -p o ta to e s  
a re  a d e q u a te  to  b rid g e  the  no  p lan ta in  p e rio d  un less ra ins a re  la te  o r bad  (as  a p p ea rs  n o t to  be 
th e  1995 c a se )
T h e  N u tr it io n  C en tre -A g ric u ltu re -H e a lth -L o c a l G o v e rn m e n t-U N IC E F -C o m m u n ity  W o m en 's  
G ro u p  a lliance  fo r im proved  child  n u tritio n  has, if  any th ing , been  s tim u la ted  by re sp o n se  to  
c ris is  P rim ary  and  hosp ita l p rim ary  h e a lth  c a re  b u rd en s  o f  re fu g ees  h av e  b een  and a p p ea r  
likely  to  c o n tin u e  to  b e  ofTset.
T w o  d a n g e rs  ex ist: an  ep idem ic  ex p lo d in g  in e scap in g  from  th e  cam p s  (o r  a  ra iny  sea so n  
ru n o f f  o f  d ried  e x crem en t w ith  th e  sam e  im p ac t) o r  a  substan tia l w o rsen in g  o f  d o m e stic  o r  
b o rd e r  secu rity .
T h e  first is  real b u t - e x ce p t fo r th e  san ita tio n  side  - co n ta in ab le  E p id em ics  h ave  to  d a te  been  
s tam p ed  o u t in th e ir  early  s tag e s  and  the  m edical s tru c tu re s  (in c lu d in g  R w an d an  in cam p  
p e rso n n e l) fo r  av e rtin g  th em  a re  s tre n g th e n in g  T h e  p o llu ted  ru n o f f  p ro b lem  is im p o n d e ra b le  - 
heavy  in itial ra in s  w o u ld  re d u c e  risk s
P e tty  p ro p e r ty  c rim es and, m u ch  less  freq u en tly , lo w  level perso n al v io len c e  h av e  risen  o u ts id e  
th e  cam p s. W h e th e r R w an d an s  a re  d irec tly  o r  ind irec tly  - v ia  th e  tro u b lin g  c o n te x t and  th e  
ex am p le  o f  th e  cam p s  by  n igh t - re sp o n sib le , is unc lear. N g a ran s  be lieve  they  a re  A  c ro ss -  
b o rd e r  secu rity  p ro b lem  is u n like ly  so  lo n g  as th e  T P D F  rem ains in p lace. N e ith e r 
n e ig h b o u rin g  a rm y  n o r  th e  ru m p  ex -re g im e  lead ers  in the  cam p s w o u ld  w ish  to  ta k e  it on  
S im ilarly , v io len ce  b u rs tin g  o u t o f  th e  cam p s  is un likely  b eca u se  the  R w an d an s  fear th e  
T an za n ian  a rm y  and  police . "B u t no  fo re ig n e rs  w e re  in jured , n o  T an zan ian s  w e re  a tta c k e d  is 
th e  rev ea lin g  a n sw er to  p la in ts  a b o u t lack  o f  re fu g ee  perso n al secu rity  a t night.
In co m e  d is trib u tio n  im pact (se e  T ab le s  3 and  4 ) is m ixed and  u n certa in . P rice  rises and  falls 
a re  co m p le x  (an d  m ust be seen  a g a in st 3 0 %  gen era l annual inflation  in T an z a n ia ) O n  th e  face 
o f  it g o v e rn m e n t em p lo y ees  a re  c le a r  lo se rs  and  N G O /A g en cy  h ires c le a r  g a in e rs  T h e  
C o m m erc ia l s e c to r  a re  c lear g a in e rs  F a rm ers  a re  ga ine rs  if  - and  on ly  i f  - loss o f  cash  bean 
sales  has b een  ofTset by  sale  o f  p lan ta in s, b a n an a  beer an d /o r w o o d  fo r fuel o r  h o u se  p o les  
W o m e n  a re  net lo se rs  for the  w o rk  o v e rlo a d  reaso n s  c ited  earlie r
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T A B L E  4
A. 1994-5 R E F U G E E  C O S T S ': NGA RA  PLUS K A R A G W E
1 Initial V illage Impact 
a  Food and Seed 
b D am ages - Schools, la trines, etc. 
c D rugs Used
$1,050,000
$100,000
$20,000
2. T ransport Cosl - Road and M arket Loss 
a. Lost Sales $3,000,000
b H igher Costs $500,000
3. M edical Services
Ncl Div ersion o f  Services $125,000
4 Fuel and W ater
W orkload (al $250A tom en. year) $4,875,000
5. A gricultural Produclion
Land Loss and D egradation $250,000
T otal S9,920.ntl0
B. 1994-5 R E F U G E E  R E L A T E D  IN C O M E  G AIN S
1 Salaries from Agencies $500,000
2 Sales o f  Bananas $3,000,000
3 O ther Sales to Refugees $500,000
4 Sales o f  Local Goods. Services Plus Trade M argins 
to Expatriates $1,500,000
T o ta l $5,500,000
N ote: ' Excludes Security expenditure
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T A B L E  5
P R O G R A M M E  C O ST S: 1994-1999 
(MOO)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
A Initial V illage ImDncl 750 - - . . 750
Reversal'
B Transport R ehabilitation
Em ergency2 4,800 - - - - 4.800
Highw ay Com pletion (3) - - - - (3)
D istrict Ronds 2.000 3.000 3.500 - - 8,500
K asulo - Kvaka 1.000 3.000 1.250 ( 1.500)4 - (6 .750)4
Sub Total 7.800 6.000 4.750 (1.500) (*) (20 .050)4
C Health*
Prim ary Health Care 2505 100 100 100 100 650
CSDP 100 100 100 100 100 500
Tanzan ia Red Cross 25 25 - - - 50
Sub Total 375 225 200 200 200 1.200
D Water*
Cam p Use Offset 100 - - - - 100
Rehabilitation/C leansing 25 125 - - - 150
A dditional W ells 150 350 350 - - 850
Sub Total 275 475 350 - - 1.100
E Forcstry/A gro-Forcstry
Initial A ctions2 95 - - - - 95
Fuel Efficiency 25 25 - - - 50
Seed I i ng/A gro-Forest ry - 250 250 250 250 1,000
Protection Planting (e g. 750 1.500 1.500 750 - 4 .500
WFP)
Sub Total 870 1.775 1.750 1.000 250 5.645
F A gricultural Sustainabilitv
and E nhancem ent6
Core Program m e too 250 250 250 250 1.100
Coffee 20 40 40 50 50 200
Rural Technology 25 25 25 25 25 125
Sub Total 145 • 315 315 325 325 1.425
G Local G overnm ent and Police
In itial2 675 - - - - 675
Police 700 100 100 - - 900
Police Post 150 - - - 150 300
Allowances 50 - - - - 50
R ehabilitation/E quipm ent 30 - - - - 30
Recurrent 25 20 15 10 - 70
Sub Total 1.630 120 115 10 150 2.025
T o ta l9 11,845 8,910 7,480 3,035 775 33,045
Notes:
1 Includes Assessment Report items som ew hat reorganised and expanded
2 Direct from Assessment Report.
1 Presum ed lo be already funded by EU.
4 Regional W orks equipm ent parks for m aintenance if  road constructed by conlractor
5 Includes Rural H ealth Centre at Kasulo
6 Very hypothetical order o f m agnitude guidelines
7 A dditional officers for 1994 and 1995 in 1995.
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U N H C R  ap p aren tly  a g re e s  early  la rg e  sca le  v o lu n ta ry  re tu rn  is un likely  and  - a t least a t field 
level - th a t v illages a re  b e tte r  th a n  cam p s  H o w ev er, d o n o rs  a re  certa in , a t b est, to  g u lp  and 
p e rh a p s  to  baulk  at the  ro u g h ly  $ 2 5 0  m illion bill for re se ttlem en t in v illages and T an zan ia  to  
m e d ita te  on  the  p ro b a b le  p e rm a n e n t 'a cq u is itio n ' o f  m ost o f  the  re fu g ee s  (ag a in  on 195 9 -6 0  
ex p erien ce ) w hen  g o o d  land is n o w  re la tively  sca rce  in m any  p a rts  o f  the c o u n try
T o  th a t th e re  a re  no  easy  a n sw e rs  - o r ra th e r  th e  easy  a n sw ers  th a t m o re  fund ing  o f  p re v en tio n  
in R w an d a  and a less se lf-serv in g  U N  fo rce  rea c tio n  a fte r th e  a ssass in a tio n  w o u ld  h av e  saved  
d o lla rs  as well as  lives d o  n o t he lp  N g a ran s  o r  K a rag w ean s  (o r  d o n o rs )  n o w  n o r o ffer m uch  
help in o u tlin ing  h o w  to  av e r t fu tu re  crises.
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A n n e x
N c a r a : E c o n o m y , P o l i t y , G o v e r n a n c e  O n  T h e  P e r i p h e r y
N g a ra  D is tric t is literally  on  th e  p e rip h e ry  o f  T anzan ia  ad jo in ing  b o th  B u ru n d i and  R w an d a  but 
w ith  very  d ifficult acc e ss  to  th e  R eg ional c ity  o fB u k o b a  and th e  re s t o f  W est L ake  R eg io n , to  
th e  L ak e  Z o n e  m e tro p o lis  o f  M w an z a  and  to  the  cap ital D ar es S a laam , tw o  days hard  d riv e  
aw ay  U ntil 25 y ears  a g o  it w a s  a lm o st u n p o p u la ted  E ven  rap id  g ro w th  from  th e  1970s has 
left th e  e stim a ted  1993 p o p u la tio n  u n d e r  2 0 0 ,0 0 0  (a t least 8 5 %  ru ral in v illages and p e rh ap s  
15%  in sm all to w n s  - N g a ra  and  R u lenge). D istance  and  lack  o f  a cc e ss  have m ade  it a  p o o r 
d is tr ic t,  a t least in te rm s  o f  c ash  in co m e  Physical and  p sy ch o lo g ica l d is ta n ce  from  th e  cap ita l 
m ean  it is less  w ell p ro v id ed  w ith  pub lic  serv ices than  av erag e , an d  p o v e rty , w hile C h ris tian  
m ed ical se rv ice s  a re  re la tive ly  s tro n g , C hristian  seco n d ary  sch o o ls  a re  not.
A g r i c u l t u r e  a n d  F o o d  S e c u r i t y
A g ricu ltu ra lly  N g a ra  has no  ab so lu te  land sho rtage, albeit m uch  o f  th e  land  is o f  m edium  to  
lo w  p o ten tia l an d /o r  su b jec t to  e ro s io n  becau se  o f  th e  p a tte rn  o f  h igh hills and  re la tive ly  s teep  
valley  slopes. It has a b o v e  typ ica l T an zan ian  rainfall in no rm al y ea rs  (o v e r  o n e  m e tre ) b u t is 
su b jec t to  d ro u g h ts  w ith  1993-94  hav ing  been  a  m o d e ra te  d ro u g h t year. T h e  co re  o f  
ag ric u ltu re  is th e  b a n an a  (e sp ec ia lly  p lan ta in ) c ro p  g ro w n  in a rd u o u s ly  p re p a re d  k ibanjas, 
fo llo w ed  by ro o t c ro p s  (sw ee t and  Irish  p o ta to e s  w ith  cassav a  a s  a d ro u g h t secu rity  fa llback), 
b e an s  an d  - a t so m e  d is tan ce  - co ffe e  T h e re  is a  substan tia l liv e s to ck  c o m p o n en t - basically  
c a t t le  - in th e  ag ricu ltu ra l s ec to r; a  c o m p o n en t w hich is sy m b io tic  w ith  c ro p s  b ecau se  m an u re  
is in teg ra l to  k iban ja  e stab lish m en t an d  m ain tenance.
A g ric u ltu ra l su sta inab ility  p ro b lem s h ave  been  g ro w in g  o v e r th e  p ast d ecad e . C o n tin u o u s  u se  
o f  k iban jas  (co m b in ed  w ith  b u rn in g  leaves no t using  them  as m u lch  as - e  g  - in the 
K ilim an ja ro /A ru sh a  z o n e )  has re d u c ed  soil fertility  and  re s is ta n ce  to  n em a to d es  and w eev ils. 
In c rea sed  h e rd s  and  c o n tin u e d  g ra s s  and  p o s t ha rvest s talk  b u rn in g  h av e  inc reased  e ro s io n  as 
ha s  th e  g ra d u a l re d u c tio n  o f  tre e  and  bush  c o v er in th e  face  o f  ris ing  fuel and  bu ild ing  m ateria l 
n e ed s  and  th e  ab sen ce  o f  sy s te m a tic  rep lan ting . H o w ev e r, a tta in ab le  sh ifts  in farm ing  sy stem s 
w o u ld  ap p e a r  a d eq u a te  to  re s to re  ba lan ce  in b o th  soil fertility  an d  land cover.
E x c e p t in d ro u g h t y e a rs  fo o d  se cu rity  is p robab ly  re la tive ly  g o o d . It ap p ea rs  likely th a t at 
least 9 0 %  o f  h o u seh o ld s  can  and  d o  g ro w  the ir o w n  basic  fo o d  su p p ly  and  m ost o f  th e  o th e rs  
e n g a g e  in so m e  food  g ro w in g  an d /o r  h ave  c lo se  fam ily links w ith  th o se  w h o  d o  A s a resu lt 
loca l s tap le  food  sales a re  very  low  ev en  in N g ara  to w n  U n d e r F ive m alnu trition  has been  
m o d e ra te ly  a b o v e  the  n a tio n a l a v e rag e  but not am ong  the  h ighest th o u g h  it is now  declin ing
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b th e re  is an  ex p ec ta tio n  o f  p ub lic  se rv ice  delivery  b o th  by pub lic  se rv an ts  and  by 
co m m u n itie s  resu lting  in b o th  co m m u n ity  and  in terna lised  p re s su re  to  fulfil it;
c co m m u n itie s  do  'to p  up ' sa la ries  o f  pub lic  se rv an ts  seen  to  d e liv e r w ith  food , h o u se  
bu ild ing  and  som e cash
P o l i t i c a l  -  T h e  M e a n i n g f u l  F l a g  a n d  B o r d e r
T h e  m o st s ta r tlin g  fact ab o u t N g a ra  D istric t is likely to  e scap e  any  o b se rv e r w ith o u t local 
h isto rica l b a c k g ro u n d  It w as  pari o f  the  o ld  K ag era  K ingdom  w h ich  like R w anda , B urund i 
(and  A nko le) w as  on e  o f  th e  T u tsi ru le r/H u tu  m ajo rity  In te rlak e  k in g d o m s Until 1915 it w as 
p a rt o f  G erm an  E ast A frica a d m in is te red  to g e th e r  w ith  R w an d a  and B urund i from  w h ich  it 
w as  no t then  seen  as rad ica lly  d ifferen t.
T o d a y  m a tte rs  a re  d ifferen t. F ew  p e o p le  in N g a ra  o r  K a rag w e  (o r  K a g era  R eg ion  in g e n era l)  
iden tify  p rim arily  as T u tsi o r  H u tu . "T an zan ian " , (and  seco n d arily  "W ahaya") a re  th e  typical 
re sp o n se s  and  a ttitu d es. T e n s io n s  and  con flic ts  ex ist b u t, on  w ealth , a cc e ss  to  officials, 
in co m er/o ld  re s iden t lines and  at levels  w hich  a re  very  low  by A frican  s tan d a rd s  and a  w o rld  
aw ay  from  B urund i, let a lo n e  R w an d a . N g a ra  D is tric t is v e ry  peace fu l - on e  o f  the v illage rs ' 
m ost in ten se  feelings a b o u t re fu g e e s  w as  am azed  h o rro r  a t h o w  v io len t they  w ere  to  each  
o th e r. T h e  c o u ld  not c o n ce iv e  w h y  q u a rre ls  a fte r d rink ing  shou ld  lead  to  reg u la r re s o r t to  
p an g as  (m a c h e te s ) and  p ro m p tly  ca lled  o u t th e  S u n g u -S u n g u  (v illage  v o lu n ta ry  m ilitia cu m  
p o lice ) even  th o u g h  th e  re fu g ees  w e re  carefu l n o t to  a tta ck  T an zan ian s . C rim es o f  th e ft and 
v io lence  in N g a ra  have risen  in 1994 (q u ite  ap a r t from  nigh t v io len ce  in B en aco  lead ing  to  4 to  
10 - a t least d o u b le  th e  ra te  fo r  th e  w h o le  o f  T an za n ia  - m u rd e rs  in m o s t d a rk  p e rio d s , so m e  
bu t n o t all po litical). T h is  is u n iv e rsa lly  a ttr ib u te d  to  re fu g ees  o r  th e ir  d is tu rb in g  im pact on  
T an za n ian  y o u th s . (K a ra g w e  h a s  ra th e r  m o re  c rim e  th an  N g a ra , in p a rtic u la r  road  band itry . 
W hile  usually  a ttr ib u ted  to  U g a n d an  in fluences  b ecau se  v io len t ru ra l b an d itry  has b een  
endem ic  th e re  fo r  at least h a lf  a  c e n tu ry , th is  fe a tu re  o f  K a ra g w e  lo n g  p re d a te s  1994 .)
In p a rt th a t ch an g e  w as an a ch iev em en t o f  B ritish  co lon ia l policy , b u t it has b een  g rea tly  
co n so lid a te d  and  d eep en ed  by in d e p e n d en t T an z an ia  and so lid ified  by  th e  A m in invasion  an d  
th e  v isions o f  h o rro r a c ro ss  th e  b o rd e rs .
N g a ran s  have re la tives  in B u ru n d i an d  R w an d a  and  in that sen se  th e  b o rd e rs  a re  artificial. B u t 
in political and socia l te rm s  th e  b o rd e rs  a re  very  real indeed  and  - like th e ir  flag  flapp ing  a t the  
b o rd e r  p o sts , b o th  to  re a ssu re  and  to  w arn  o f f  - a re  m ean ingfu l to  N g a ran s  and K arag w ean s. 
T an zan ia  is a nation  s ta te  and  on  th e  n o rth -w es t p e riphe ry  th a t fact is, as  o f  1994, an  e spec ia lly
re lev an t and  reassu rin g  o n e  to  its  c itizens.
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P o litics  in m o re  co n v en tio n a l senses  is no t p ro m in en t O n e  o r tw o  o p p o s itio n  p a rtie s  have 
m em bers  w ith  o ffices  in th e ir  h o u ses  in N g a ra , bu t on  th e  w ho le  m ulti p a rty ism  is n o t an  issue  
T h e  d isa s te rs  a c ro ss  the  b o rd e r  have p robab ly  re in fo rced  that - the  po lice  and  t ro o p s  they  
needed  cam e  from  th e  g o v e rn m en t, as  did the inc reased  p resen ce  o f  the  R eg ional 
C o m m issio n e r and  th e  se lec tiv e  s tre n g th en in g  o f  key D is tric t p o s ts  A t ru ra l o r  sm all to w n  
level th e  g o v e rn m en t and th e  m ajo rity  p a rty  tend  to  be  seen  as one  T h e  o p p o s itio n  is 
p e rce iv ed  as a se t o f  c ritic s  o f  w ha t th e  g o v e rn m en t a s  such  do es, n o t s im ply  o f  th e  m a jo rity  
party ; a  p e rc ep tio n  n o t no tab ly  ad d in g  to  o th e r  p a rtie s ' appeal in N g a ra  o r K a ra g w e  in 19 94  
w hen  they  a p p e a r  to  have po lled  u n d e r 5%  w ith  no  sea ts  in local g o v e rn m e n t e le c tio n s  (v e rsu s  
2 0 %  to  2 5 %  and  4 %  re sp ec tiv e ly  nationally ).
